Institutional design of gender electoral quotas in EU countries: a comparative analysis of France, Belgium, and Sweden

Abstract

This article compares the institutional design of gender electoral quotas in three EU countries that represent fundamentally different regulatory models: France (legislative quotas with financial sanctions), Belgium (legislative quotas with a list-rejection mechanism and the zipper principle), and Sweden (voluntary party quotas). Drawing on the analytical framework of feminist institutionalism, the study examines how formal quota rules interact with informal institutional practices. The comparison is organised along four dimensions: quota threshold, placement mandates, enforcement mechanism, and interaction with the electoral system. The analysis shows that quota effectiveness depends less on the formal threshold than on the configuration of design elements around it. France and Belgium adopted the same 50% parity target but achieved markedly different outcomes because their enforcement mechanisms differ: automatic list rejection (Belgium) proved far more effective than financial penalties (France), which in practice functioned as an escape clause. Placement mandates – the zipper principle and the top-two rule – emerge as a critical design element. The Swedish model of voluntary party quotas is shown to work only where a specific set of institutional and cultural preconditions exists. All three models share a common limitation: higher numbers of women in parliament do not automatically translate into access to executive power. The findings are directly relevant for Ukraine, where a mandatory 40% gender quota for party lists was legislated in 2019 and first enforced through list rejection in the 2020 local elections. A systematic assessment of the quota’s effectiveness, particularly with regard to enforcement mechanisms and candidate placement rules, can draw on the comparative experience of established EU democracies.